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Public voices in the heavenly chorus? Group type bias
and opinion representation
Linda Flöthea and Anne Rasmussen a,b
aLeiden University, Institute for Public Administration, Den Haag, Netherlands; bDepartment of
Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
ABSTRACT
While strong voices in the academic literature and real-world politics regard
interest groups as biased representatives of the public, we know little about
the scope and consequences of such biases for democratic governance. We
conduct the ﬁrst cross-national comparison of group and public preferences
analyzing a new dataset of 50 issues in ﬁve West European countries. Despite
the negative image of interest groups in politics, we ﬁnd that their positions
are in line with public opinion more than half the time. Moreover, while ﬁrms
and business associations enjoy weaker support for their positions among
citizens than public interest groups, they still enjoy the backing of a sizable
share of the public. Additionally, we ﬁnd no general pattern that communities
with low interest group diversity are less likely to represent public opinion.
Our ﬁndings have implications for democratic governance and discussions of
how to conceptualize and measure biases in interest representation.
KEYWORDS Interest groups; public opinion; public policy; representation; congruence
The issue of bias in pressure group systems remains one of the core topics in
interest group research (Dür and Mateo 2013; Lowery and Gray 2016; Rasmus-
sen and Gross 2015; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Ever since Schattschnei-
der’s famous assertion that the heavenly chorus does not provide equal
voice to all interests (1960), scholars have spent ample time investigating
possible bias in the accent of interest representatives. Yet, while there is an
abundant literature on bias in interest representation, there is a lack of a
common benchmark for judging the representativeness of organized inter-
ests (e.g., Lowery et al. 2015; Lowery and Gray 2004; Schlozman 1984). Never-
theless a lot of empirical commentary operates with at least an implicit
benchmark. Lobbyists are often criticized for representing special interests
rather than the voice of the population as a whole. For instance, more than
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDer-
ivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
CONTACT Anne Rasmussen ar@ifs.ku.dk
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1489418.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY
2019, VOL. 26, NO. 6, 824–842
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2018.1489418
half of those asked in Germany and the UK in Transparency International’s
2013 Global Corruption Barometer respond that their national governments
are run by self-interested groups rather than for the beneﬁt of the general
public.1
We propose a new benchmark for assessing bias by conducting a study of
opinion representation examining how closely the positions of interest groups
and the public are aligned. Whereas a large literature studies ideological con-
gruence between citizens and their representatives (e.g., Golder and Ferland
2017; Huber and Powell 1994), the alignment of public and interest group pos-
itions has not been examined in a systematic manner except in a few US
studies (Claassen and Nicholson 2013; Gilens 2012; Page et al. 1987). Under-
standing whether and when lobbyists counter public preferences, and
which lobbyists are representative of what the public wants is essential for
understanding the role of lobbying in modern policy-making. Such an analysis
is important to address both the public fears of lobbying capture, as well as for
discussions in democratic theory on the role of groups (see Gilens and Page
2014).
Many argue that some group types are more likely to bias policy-making
rather than considering the policy positions of these groups (Gray and
Lowery 2000; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).
Focus is often on whether especially business interests are overrepresented
compared to other group types or whether the representation of diﬀerent
substantive interests is ensured. Yet, the question remains whether those
types of interest groups and interest group communities subject to criticism are
actually the ones least likely to represent the opinion of the general public.
To examine this question, we analyze a new dataset of 50 issues in ﬁve
West European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and
the UK). Our study is the ﬁrst to systematically compare group and public pre-
ferences on a high number of speciﬁc policy issues in several countries. It pro-
vides a comprehensive account of the relationship between interest group
positions and public opinion by relying on diﬀerent ways of conceptualizing
and measuring opinion representation.
We ﬁrst conduct analyses at the level of individual groups examining
whether the types of advocates conventionally expected to cause bias in
the group community are less aligned with public opinion. Thereafter, a
series of issue-level analyses scrutinize whether the likelihood of ﬁnding cor-
respondence between public opinion and the opinion of the advocacy com-
munity on an issue is aﬀected by how diverse a set of substantial interests the
group community represents.
Rather than providing clear-cut support or disapproval of the negative view
of groups, we show that advocates are on the same side as the public in a little
over half of the cases. While there are some expected diﬀerences between
group types in opinion representation our results also underline that group
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type is not as strong a predictor as conventional wisdom might lead us to
expect. The positions voiced by ﬁrms and business groups enjoy the
support of signiﬁcantly lower shares of citizens than public interest groups
but this pattern is less clear for other group types representing narrower inter-
ests. We also do not ﬁnd consistent statistical evidence that an advocacy com-
munity with a biased distribution of advocates across diﬀerent actor types is
less likely to be aligned with public opinion on an issue. Our results have impli-
cations for democratic governance and how we conceptualize bias in interest
group research.
Conceptualizing the relationship between advocates and the
public
We conduct an analysis of opinion representation examining how closely
groups preferences and public opinion are aligned on speciﬁc policy issues.
Our approach is similar to the one used in the broader literature on political
representation, in which the substantive overlap in the policy positions of citi-
zens and elites has been studied through the concept of ideological congru-
ence (e.g., Golder and Ferland 2017; Huber and Powell 1994). While our study
looks at interest groups (rather than elected politicians) and citizens, we share
the interest of this literature in what Pitkin (1967) coined ‘substantive rep-
resentation’. Hence, our analysis ultimately provides information about the
incentive of interest groups to act as representatives for the people and
promote their interests.
We make an important addition to existing work on group bias which pre-
dominantly relies on frequencies of group types (e.g., Gray and Lowery 2000;
Rasmussen and Carroll 2014; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). By interest groups
(or advocates), we refer to a broad range of non-state actors engaged in public
policy-making, including membership associations, ﬁrms and expert organiz-
ations (Baroni et al. 2014). Including citizens in the equation helps us evaluate
the perhaps most widespread criticism of lobbying, namely that it does not
present a voice representative of the population (Gastil 2000; McFarland
1991). Only a few studies on the US have examined the alignment of interest
groups and public opinion (e.g., Claassen and Nicholson 2013; Gilens 2012;
Page et al. 1987). For instance, Gilens found that the policy preferences of
interest groups and the public are uncorrelated but his study is restricted to
the most powerful interests only.
While all our analyses of opinion representation examine how closely
aligned the substantive policy positions of groups and the public are,
they use diﬀerent benchmarks for public opinion. Some measures calculate
correspondence between groups and the public as a whole, whereas others
indicate whether groups represent the median citizen. Hence, we speak to
both a proportional vision of democracy expecting representatives to
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resemble the public at large (Pitkin 1967: 60–91) and a majoritarian empha-
sizing their ability to represent the median citizen (for criticism, see de Toc-
queville 2010).
Second, similar to the ideological congruence literature (Golder and
Stramski 2010) the relationship between the public and groups can be ana-
lyzed in several ways. We look at both ‘many-to-one relationships’ focusing
on the alignment between citizens and individual interest group actors and
‘many-to-many relationships’ comparing the cumulative preferences of citi-
zens and the entire group community on an issue.
Variation in opinion representation
One option is to see interest groups as transmission belts that help the public
get its message across to policy-makers acting as ‘surrogates for the public’
allowing policymakers to produce outputs that ‘beneﬁt directly from the
public’s considerable wisdom and experience with the topic at hand’
(Furlong and Kerwin 2004: 354, see also Rasmussen et al. 2014). However,
while groups may voice an opinion that is representative of that of the
public, their role is usually not to represent the population on a given issue
but a more limited set of interests (Lowery et al. 2015).
Importantly, the dangers of relying on groups as representatives should
vary in diﬀerent circumstances. Empirical studies of bias often expect that
some types of groups and group communities are more likely to raise con-
cerns (see e.g., Gray and Lowery 2000; Rasmussen and Carroll 2014; Schloz-
man and Tierney 1986). The underlying mechanism seems to be related to
the scope of the interests represented either by the diﬀerent group types or
by diﬀerent group communities. The expectation is that those that represent
broader interests are more likely to act as representatives. Consequently, the
capacity of diﬀerent group types and group communities to represent public
opinion is at the core of our theoretical framework.
We focus on cross-sectional variation in the alignment of groups and public
opinion rather than conduct a dynamic analysis of how the two aﬀect each
other, since repeated measures of public opinion on our issues are not avail-
able. Yet our theoretical predictions take into account that at a given point of
time this alignment may be the result of both similarities in the opinion of
the two before an issue became subject to attention and aﬀected by
whether groups and the public have been able to inﬂuence the opinion of
each other in the course of policymaking (Dür and Mateo 2014; Kollman
1998). Thus, when speaking of opinion representation we remain open to
the possibility that causality ﬂows in both directions with both groups and
the public being able to represent the opinion of each other.
It is widely expected that interest groups try to shape public opinion, even
if the empirical evidence is mixed (e.g., Andsager 2000; Kim and Margalit 2017;
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McEntire et al. 2015; Page et al. 1987; Smith 2000). Nevertheless, we cannot
rule out the opposite relationship; i.e., that some groups pay attention to
the public when forming their positions. Interest group leaders can take
cues from the public, which may aﬀect their calculations which policy to
defend (Holyoke 2003). We argue that interest groups that represent
broader public interests are the ones most actively aiming at inﬂuencing
public opinion, and the ones with the greatest need to respond to the
shifts in public opinion to maintain support. Moreover, we expect the same
logic to apply if we examine correspondence between the opinion of the
entire group community on an issue and public opinion.
Variation across group types
Studies of bias are typically not equally concerned about all types of interest
groups and frequently refer to Olson’s (1971) seminal work (e.g., Schlozman
2010). He argued that special interest groups representing particular constitu-
encies face fewer collective action problems mobilizing than groups repre-
senting diﬀuse, public interests. Worries arise because those groups that
should have the easiest time mobilizing are also the ones least likely to be
strong candidates for representing the general interests. The underlying
assumption seems to be that there is a link between the scope of the interests
of these groups and whether their opinion is aligned with public opinion.
We draw a distinction between ‘diﬀuse’ and ‘concentrated’ interests. The
former represent wider societal interests often involving the provision of
public goods (e.g., environmental and consumer groups). In contrast, concen-
trated interests in our terminology are those with a well-deﬁned, narrow con-
stituency that provide concentrated beneﬁts to their members or supporters.
The latter can both represent speciﬁc economic interests (e.g., business
groups and trade unions) or speciﬁc identity subgroups (e.g., LGBT support
groups, women’s associations or particular hobbies).
Diﬀerences in how closely these diﬀuse and concentrated interests are
aligned with public opinion may result from not only diﬀerences in the
scope of interests they represent, but also from variation in their ability to
inﬂuence public opinion. Diﬀuse interests may be more successful in
swaying public opinion than groups representing concentrated constituen-
cies. Citizen groups representing diﬀuse, mass-based interests are more
likely to apply outsider lobbying strategies aimed at shifting public opinion
by raising issue awareness (Kollman 1998). Going public is relatively cheap
and eﬀective for them (Dür and Mateo 2013: 663–4). Instead, groups repre-
senting concentrated interests – e.g., business associations and ﬁrms but
also many trade unions and occupational groups – often have a comparative
advantage in inside lobbying since they possess specialized information
demanded by policymakers (ibid.). Perhaps as a result of such diﬀerences in
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lobbying focus, Page et al. (1987: 37) found that groups representing speciﬁc,
narrow interests have a negative impact on public opinion, whereas broader,
mass-based interests can have a positive one.
When considering the reverse relationship in which groups adapt to public
opinion, we also expect the dynamic to work in a way that results in closer
alignment with public opinion for diﬀuse interests than for concentrated
interests. The latter should generally be less responsive to public opinion
when formulating their policy positions. Hence, even if all organizations aim
to ensure survival (Klüver 2011; Lowery and Gray 1995), they diﬀer in their sur-
vival strategies. For many organizations representing concentrated interests
ensuring organizational maintenance is frequently a question of delivering
certain services to the more speciﬁc, narrow economic or identity interests
they represent (Klüver 2011). Being responsive to the concerns of the public
could sometimes even be suicidal for them if this entails the risk of alienating
their members and supporters. Instead, public interest groups typically rely on
broad-based membership (Berry 1999; Bevan 2013) and satisfying both exist-
ing and potential members in the general public is therefore more likely to
aﬀect their survival. Failure to adapt their views to a shift in the public
mood can potentially be costly, as members can withdraw their membership,
possibly selecting another organization that better represents their interests,
and potential new members may be disincentivized from joining. Therefore,
we predict that,
1: Opinion representation is less likely for groups representing concentrated as
opposed to diﬀuse interests.
Bias in the interest group community
At the issue level, the conﬁguration of interests might also aﬀect the align-
ment between groups and public opinion. The mobilization of diverse types
of substantial interests on an issue can be expected to increase the likelihood
that diﬀerent parts of society are represented compared to one on which very
homogenous groups mobilize. Hojnacki’s recent contribution on bias argues
that, while it is impossible to know what the proportion of diﬀerent group
types should be in an unbiased system, bias should generally be lower with
a reduction of imbalances between the types of interests represented. Accord-
ing to her, ‘a more heterogeneous mix of interests than currently exists would
represent a move in the right direction’ (Lowery et al. 2015: 1218).
Similarly pluralist theory leads us to expect that when many groups
mobilize they do so to counterbalance each other. Truman famously argued
how in cases of policy disequilibria occurring with some types of groups mobi-
lizing, other might mobilize and ‘restore balance’ (Truman 1951). Interest
group research has indeed found some evidence that groups such as those
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representing citizen and public interests could have some ‘countervailing
power’ to other types of groups such as business and professional associ-
ations (McFarland 2010: 42). Communities consisting of countervailing inter-
ests should thus have a higher chance of acting as agents of the general
public.
The mobilization of a diverse set of interest group types can also be
expected to play a positive role in the alignment of public and advocacy
opinion when we consider the ability of the two to inﬂuence each other. In
the case of diversity, we would expect that, if a diverse set of groups is
active, the public discussion is informed by multiple perspectives. If public
opinion is responsive to (or maybe even aﬀected by) group opinion,
members of the public should ‘listen more’ to a group community represent-
ing a broad range of diﬀerent interests than one representing only a few
group types. In turn, it might also be easier for various segments of the
public to aﬀect the voice of the advocacy community when the public can
interact with groups representing a multitude of substantial interests. In con-
trast, a less diverse set of groups may decrease the likelihood that any given
segment of the public can have its voice heard. Communities where certain
types of substantial interests dominate should therefore on average hold pos-
itions more at odds with the opinion of the general public. Our second predic-
tion is thus that,
2: Opinion representation is less likely, the higher the level of concentration in
the types of interest groups mobilized on an issue.
Analysis design
Our dataset pools information on public opinion and interest group activity in
ﬁve countries on altogether 50 issues. We do not expect overall diﬀerences in
state-society structures between pluralist and corporatist types of systems to
play a strong role for how closely the positions of groups and the public on
speciﬁc policy issues are aligned. Yet, our selection of countries allows us to
control for such system-level variation by including both systems typically
classiﬁed as experiencing strong or moderate levels of corporatism
(Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden) and a more pluralist one
(the UK) (Jahn 2016; Siaroﬀ 1999).
All issues come from high-quality opinion polls of a representative sample
of the adult population. All of the selected questions involve a call for future
policy change on speciﬁc policy issues under national jurisdiction and
measure responses on an agreement scale (Gilens 2012; Rasmussen et al.
2018), For example, one of our Dutch issues asks whether euthanasia
should be banned and a Swedish one concerns the question of allowing
free downloads of ﬁlms and music from the Internet. While sampling issues
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on which public opinion is available creates the risk of studying issues with
higher salience than average (Burstein 2014), it increases the likelihood ‘that
average citizens may have real opinions and may exert some political
inﬂuence’ (Gilens and Page 2014: 568). Moreover, issues are selected in
such a way that there is substantial variation in media saliency between
them. The latter was measured by conducting a keyword search in a major
national newspaper for each issue (Politiken in Denmark, German Süddeutsche
Zeitung, the Guardian in the UK, Dagens Nyheter in Sweden, and the Dutch de
Volkskrant). The 10 selected items per country (see Online Appendix B) also
vary in policy type (regulatory, distributive, redistributive) and the level of
public support for policy change.
The lowest unit in our analyses is an actor on an issue, of which we have
771 cases. We include all actors for whom we could identify a policy position
either in favor of or against the speciﬁc call for policy change in the poll2 and
mapped advocacy on the issues for an observation period of up to four years
(see also Gilens 2012).3 Four separate rounds of data gathering (see Online
Appendix A) yielded the sample of active advocates. First, student assistants
coded all active advocates making statements on the issues in two broad-
sheet newspapers per country (one left- and one right-leaning, to control
for potential diﬀerences in the overall tone of advocacy) as in favor of or
against the proposed policy change.4 Second, we conducted expert inter-
views on the 50 issues with policy oﬃcials who had worked on the issue in
our observation period (response rate 82%), asking them to identify additional
advocates to those identiﬁed in the media. Third, we also relied on in-depth
desk research of online sources and physical archives to identify advocates
involved in government interaction on the issues (e.g., public consultations
and parliamentary committee hearings). Fourth, a survey was distributed to
the advocates identiﬁed in step 1–3, in which respondents were asked to
name the most important actors on an issue. The overall response rate was
34% and we received responses from 478 actors. Actors mentioned that did
not appear in the other sources were added to the dataset and their positions
were coded by searching for policy documents or position papers. Intercoder
reliability tests conducted by two coders on 50 randomly selected units
revealed a Krippendorﬀ’s alpha of .78 for the coding of positions and a
score of .92 for the coding of group type.
There are multiple ways of comparing the preferences of groups and the
public to measure opinion representation (see Appendix C for an overview
of four diﬀerent approaches). In the main paper, we focus on the volume of
opinion representation at the level of individual groups, i.e., how large a
share of the public is aligned with the group’s position. This measure helps
us assess not only whether an advocate is supported by the median
member of the public but also how strong public support or opposition the
group enjoys for its positions. As an example, an actor supporting change
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has a score of 100 on this ‘many-to-one’ measure when all respondents in the
opinion poll supported change. At the issue-level, we look at the absolute per-
centage point diﬀerence in the shares of the interest group community and
the public on an issue, which supported policy change. This ‘many-to-many’
measure allows us to directly compare the distributions of our dichotomous
position measures. It ranges from 0 when support for change is identical in
the two communities to 100 when the two are opposed. After our analyses
we report on robustness checks using alternative measures of opinion
representation.
To test Prediction 1 that opinion representation varies between groups
representing concentrated and diﬀuse interests, our actor-level models
include the type of advocate. We distinguish between: (1) public interest
groups, (2) business groups, (3) ﬁrms, (4) trade unions and occupational
associations, (5) hobby and identity groups, and (6) expert organizations,
think tanks and institutional associations. Public interest groups are promi-
nent examples of groups that ‘seek to advance diﬀuse beneﬁts to their
members as well as everybody else’ (Binderkrantz et al. 2014: 881) and
include e.g., environmental and consumer groups and associations promoting
international humanitarian work. Groups in the second, third, fourth and ﬁfth
categories all defend the interests of concentrated constituencies, with vari-
ation in whether the subgroups promoted are economic (as in the case of
business groups, ﬁrms and trade unions) or identity based (as in the case of
hobby and identity groups). Finally, expert organizations, think tanks and insti-
tutional associations may promote either diﬀuse or concentrated interests.
Online Appendix D provides a more detailed list of the group types included
in the six categories.
To test Prediction 2, our issue-level models include the Herﬁndahl-Hirsch-
man Index (HHI), which indicates the distribution of advocates between the
six categories of actor types. Initially developed to measure the concentration
of ﬁrms within an industry, the HHI equals the sum of the squared proportions
of actors in the diﬀerent categories and ranges from 1/number of group types
(in our case 1/6) to 1, 1 indicating the highest level of concentration with all
groups falling into one category. The HHI can be criticized for implicitly assum-
ing that our six categories of advocates are equally important for representing
public opinion. Therefore, we also consider an alternative measure of issue-
level bias by including the share of ﬁrms and business associations relative
to all advocates on an issue. This measure also relates to frequent criticisms
of bias in the literature owed to the dominance of business interests (Rasmus-
sen and Carroll 2014; Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).
We control for a number of additional factors. First, we include dummies for
the diﬀerent policy types in our sample distinguishing between distributive,
regulatory and redistributive issues (Lowi 1964), and our measure for the
media saliency of an issue. It records the number of articles in one daily
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newspaper per country; identiﬁed with a Boolean keyword search for articles
published one month prior until one month after the question was asked in
the opinion poll.5 The measure is standardized within each country and
higher numbers indicate higher media attention. Second, we include
country-ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved heterogeneity between obser-
vations from the diﬀerent countries. Finally, our issue-level analyses control for
the number of actors on an issue, since the likelihood that the group commu-
nity represents public opinion might be higher when many advocates are
active.6
Analysis
Before our multivariate analyses, we start with some descriptives on congru-
ence between group opinion and the public median. At the issue level, the
share of policy issues where the majorities of interest groups and the public
are aligned is 60% (see Online Appendix E). According to Table 1, the actor-
level ﬁgures are similar with 54% of the individual advocates holding pos-
itions congruent with the public majority. As expected, we ﬁnd higher con-
gruence for public interest groups than for the actor types representing
concentrated interests (signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level or lower): 78% of
public interest groups hold a position congruent with the public majority,
while the numbers for business groups and ﬁrms are 41% and 45%, respect-
ively. Yet, no matter which of all the group types representing concentrated
interests we examine, a sizable share of them are aligned with the public
majority.
Turning to our multivariate analysis of the volume of opinion represen-
tation in Table 2, we ﬁnd a similar pattern. Since advocates are nested in
policy issues these regressions are run as multi-level regressions with
random intercepts for the issues, ﬁrst including actor types and country
ﬁxed eﬀects only before including controls.7 Public interests have a signiﬁ-
cantly larger share of the public on their side (58% according to Model 2)
than ﬁrms and business groups (49% and 48% respectively). When comparing
them to the other group types representing concentrated interests the
Table 1. Actor level congruence between interest groups and the public opinion
majority.
Diﬀuse
interests Concentrated interests Mixed interests
Public
interest
groups
Business
groups Firms
Trade
unions &
occupa-tional
assoc.
Hobby &
identity
groups
Expert
organizations,
think tanks &
institutional
associations Total
Congruence % 77.86 40.83 45.45 60.40 60.00 41.23 53.83
Total n N 140 120 198 149 50 114 771
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evidence is more mixed.8 The scores for hobby and identity groups are never
signiﬁcantly lower than for public interest groups, and the volumes of public
support for trade unions and occupational associations are only signiﬁcantly
lower at the 0.10 level in the regression without controls.9 With respect to
the controls, there is no eﬀect of policy types on the likelihood of having a
higher share of the public on one’s side, but media saliency negatively
aﬀects the volume of public support (albeit marginally). Moreover, German
groups have a somewhat lower volume of public support for their views
than the Swedish groups (p < 0.10 or lower).
As a next step, Models 3–8 test Prediction 2 that low diversity in the advo-
cacy community weakens opinion representation by increasing the distance
between the shares of support for policy change among groups and the
public (Table 3). The ﬁrst three models examine the eﬀect of the level of con-
centration in the types of mobilized groups, starting with a model with the
HHI only before introducing country ﬁxed eﬀects and issue-level controls.
In all three Models, the positive sign of the eﬀect for the HHI is as expected
indicating that the higher the bias in group types represented, the greater the
distance between the share of the public and the interest groups supporting
policy change. Yet, whereas this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level in Model
3 and at the 0.01 level in Model 4, it fails to achieve signiﬁcance in Model 5
adding controls. At best we therefore havemixed evidence that group commu-
nities in which the advocates are distributed unevenly across diﬀerent
Table 2. Share of the public supporting the actor’s position.
(1) (2)
Volume Volume
Group Type (ref.: Public Interest Groups)
Hobby & Identity −0.03 (0.03) −0.03 (0.03)
Business Groups −0.10*** (0.03) −0.10*** (0.03)
Trade Unions & Occupational Groups −0.05+ (0.03) −0.04 (0.03)
Firms −0.09*** (0.02) −0.09*** (0.02)
Expert Org, Think Tanks & Institutional Assoc. −0.14*** (0.03) −0.14*** (0.03)
Issue-level Controls
Country (ref: Germany)
UK 0.00 (0.04) −0.01 (0.04)
Denmark 0.05 (0.04) 0.05 (0.04)
Sweden 0.07+ (0.04) 0.08* (0.04)
Netherlands 0.01 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
Policy Type (ref: Distributive Issues)
Regulatory −0.00 (0.04)
Redistributive −0.00 (0.04)
Standardized media saliency −0.02+ (0.01)
Constant 0.57*** (0.03) 0.56*** (0.04)
Policy Issue Intercept 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Level 1 Residual 0.04 (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)
Number of Cases 771 771
AIC −271 −268
BIC −215 −199
Notes: Multi-level Linear Regressions with SEs in Parentheses, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
834 L. FLÖTHE AND A. RASMUSSEN
advocacy categories display a lower likelihood of being congruent with the
public majority.10 Models 6–8 examine the impact of the alternative measure
of issue-level bias, i.e., the share of business interests on an issue. While in
two out of the three Models this measure has the expected sign with a
higher share of business groups increasing the distance, it fails to achieve stat-
istical signiﬁcance in all speciﬁcations. Overall, these ﬁndings indicate that
there is no straightforward relationship between bias in the interest commu-
nity on an issue and opinion representation. With respect to the controls,
higher saliency results in a larger distance between the public and the interest
groups (Models 5 and 8). Instead, a higher number of actors on the issue
decreases the distance in Model 8. Finally, there are few diﬀerences between
the countries with the exception of Swedish cases demonstrating a slightly
lower absolute distance than German ones in one of the models (p < 0.10).
Additional measures of opinion representation
Our online appendices G-I consider additional measures of examining the
alignment between groups and the public (see Online Appendix C). First,
Table 3. Absolute percentage point diﬀerence between the shares of the public and
interest groups on an issue supporting policy change.
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance Distance
HHI 0.30*
(0.12)
0.33**
(0.12)
0.17
(0.15)
Share of business groups 0.00
(0.10)
−0.01
(0.10)
0.15
(0.11)
Issue-level Controls
Country (ref: Germany)
UK −0.03
(0.08)
0.02
(0.09)
−0.01
(0.09)
0.05
(0.09)
Denmark −0.12
(0.08)
−0.11
(0.09)
−0.09
(0.09)
−0.08
(0.08)
Sweden −0.08
(0.08)
−0.14
(0.09)
−0.05
(0.09)
−0.16+
(0.09)
Netherlands −0.07
(0.08)
−0.09
(0.09)
−0.04
(0.09)
−0.08
(0.09)
Number of actors on an issue
(logged)
−0.08
(0.05)
−0.13**
(0.04)
Media saliency 0.06+
(0.03)
0.08*
(0.03)
Policy Type (ref: Distributive Issues)
Regulatory −0.01
(0.09)
0.01
(0.09)
Redistributive −0.06
(0.09)
−0.09
(0.09)
Constant 0.12*
(0.06)
0.17*
(0.08)
0.49*
(0.21)
0.26***
(0.04)
0.30***
(0.08)
0.66***
(0.16)
Number of cases 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.07 0.07 −0.02 −0.08 0.09
Note: OLS Regressions with SEs in Parentheses, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Online Appendix G examines the likelihood that individual groups (Models
G1-G2) and the majority of groups on an issue (Models G3-G8) hold a position
congruent with the public majority. Using this measure, we ﬁnd somewhat
stronger evidence that public interest groups are more closely aligned with
the public. Yet, while their likelihood of being aligned with the public is sig-
niﬁcantly higher than for all other group types, 25% of them (according to
Model G2) are not aligned with the public majority. Moreover, again we
have at best mixed evidence that diversity matters in the issue-level analyses.
While we ﬁnd some marginally signiﬁcant eﬀects of the share of business
groups in two of the three regressions, there are no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects for the HHI.
Second, Online Appendix H conducts a similar test using a third measure of
opinion representation, i.e., the correlation between the policy positions of
groups and the public. As explained in more detail in the Appendix, this
measure indicates whether advocacy support for a given policy change
increases as the level of support for change in the general public increases.
Similar to what we saw in the congruence analysis, public interest groups
experience somewhat stronger opinion representation using this measure.
Hence, the relationship between their positions and public opinion on an
issue (see Table H1 and Figure H1) is generally stronger than for other
group types. Using this measure, there is again little support for Prediction
2 in our issue-level regression (see Table H2). Hence, we do not ﬁnd statistical
evidence that the HHI or the share of business groups condition the relation-
ship between support for policy change in the general public and the interest
group community.
Finally, Online Appendix I explores variation in the share of the public
holding the same position as the majority of the interest groups (pro/con
policy change) on an issue. Here we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the HHI at the
0.05 level in one of the threemodels before adding controls. Yet, the alternative
measure of interest group bias at the issue-level, i.e., the share of business
groups, is not signiﬁcantly related to this measure either (see Table I1).
Overall, we see that, while there are some diﬀerences in ﬁndings depend-
ing on the conceptualization and measurement of opinion representation, the
vast share of the analyses do not present strong evidence for our two theor-
etical predictions. There is no general tendency for groups representing
diﬀuse interests to clearly distinguish themselves from all the diﬀerent
groups representing narrower, concentrated constituencies. Even in the ana-
lyses where group type performs best as a predictor, a signiﬁcant share of the
groups expected to represent the public do not, whereas many groups
expected to represent subsets of the public score higher than we might
have expected. Second, we also ﬁnd little evidence that measures of bias in
the interest group community aﬀect opinion representation at the issue
level. At best, we ﬁnd support for only one of two measures of group bias
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and the eﬀects are never consistent across all the diﬀerent model speciﬁca-
tions. Overall, these additional analyses therefore give credence to the
results in the paper.
Conclusion
Whether interest groups serve as a transmission belt of public preferences has
been a recurrent theme in the academic literature and real-world politics alike.
Strong voices warn of the potential biases in the group community that may
not represent the public at large. Yet, whereas there is no shortage of recent
studies demonstrating how the interest group community is dominated by
business groups representing narrow and speciﬁc interests (e.g., Rasmussen
and Carroll 2014; Schlozman and Tierney 1986), we know little about the
scope and consequences of bias in practice. Even if interest groups are fre-
quently criticized for obstructing democratic governance, their degree of
representativeness is typically not examined with respect to a clear bench-
mark (Lowery and Brasher 2004).
To judge whether advocates represent public preferences, we conducted a
systematic analysis of opinion representation using public opinion as a bench-
mark for assessing how closely interest group positions are aligned with
citizen views. We compared information about public opinion and interest
groups positions on 50 speciﬁc policy issues in ﬁve Western European
countries using four diﬀerent ways of conceptualizing and measuring the
alignment of public opinion and group preferences.
Our ﬁndings neither conﬁrm nor disconﬁrm the fears of advocates as
biased representatives of the public. Whether conducting the analysis at
the individual or issue level, groups are congruent with the majority of the
public a little over half of the time. This underlines the potential for groups
to serve as a transmission belt but also reminds us to approach group invol-
vement with a critical eye. Similar to what we have seen in research on the US,
there is no correlation between the position of the group community as a
whole and public opinion on an issue (Gilens 2012).
Our results underline that the relationship between group type and
opinion representation is not as strong as conventional wisdom might lead
us to expect: While ﬁrms and business groups enjoy weaker support for
their positions among citizens than public interest groups, the pattern is
less clear for other group types representing narrower interests. The fact
that some types of interest groups represent narrower public constituencies
does not disqualify them from acting in line with public preferences
altogether. On the other hand, some public interest groups may be more
distant from their grassroots and the public than is sometimes expected.
Our ﬁndings also show that having many diﬀerent types of groups rep-
resented does not necessarily ensure that groups are more likely to represent
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public opinion. We do not ﬁnd consistent evidence that how narrowly active
advocates are distributed across group types aﬀects opinion representation.
Having the expectation that advocates should distribute evenly across a set
of interest group categories for advocacy opinion to be in line with public
opinion might be unrealistic. However, the ﬁndings are also at best mixed
when using the relative dominance of business interests on an issue as an
alternative measure of bias. These ﬁndings certainly do not rule out that
the composition of the group community still plays a role for both demo-
cratic representation and, ultimately, policy responsiveness. Hence, we
must remember that there may be many diﬀerent ways of conceptualizing
and measuring bias in practice. However, they outline the challenges of
drawing simple inferences about biases in representation based on group
type alone. This is not least the case because even among actors belonging
to the same group type there may be diﬀerences in policy positions and
organizational attributes (Baroni et al. 2014). Our results also emphasize
the importance of paying attention to multiple measures of opinion rep-
resentation. Hence, while we found a number of similarities in the ﬁndings
obtained from using four diﬀerent conceptualizations and measurements,
we also found smaller diﬀerences in the explanatory power of some of
our key independent variables between the four. This underlines that
opinion representation is a multi-faceted concept and underscores the
potential gains of being sensitive to its diﬀerent conceptualizations in
research designs.
Future research will be able to add to our study by theorizing and
testing diﬀerences in opinion representation not only between those repre-
senting diﬀuse and concentrated interests but also between diﬀerent
subsets of groups within these broader categories, e.g., groups representing
economic and identity interests. Hence, our empirical analyses underlined
that there are also diﬀerences in opinion representation between groups
representing narrower, concentrated interests. In addition, there is scope
for exploring diﬀerences in opinion representation for larger numbers of
policy issues and over longer periods of time in future studies. While our
theoretical framework explicitly considers that the level of opinion represen-
tation at any given point of time is likely to be the result of both groups
and the public having mutually inﬂuenced each other, our cross-sectional
dataset does not allow us to directly examine the processes through
which this happens. A key challenge for conducting such dynamic studies
is the lack of public opinion data at the level of speciﬁc policy issues
over longer time periods as well as the costliness of gathering longitudinal
interest group data. However, as more public opinion data at the policy
issue level becomes available and new technologies for extracting interest
group data develop, future research will be able to pursue such a research
agenda.
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Notes
1. https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013 (accessed October 14, 2017).
2. 16 actors who expressed opposing positions are excluded from the analysis.
3. More speciﬁcally, advocacy was measured one month prior to the relevant
opinion poll and until a policy decision was taken on the issue or 4 years in
the cases in which there was no reaction to the call for action.
4. In addition to the newspapers used to measure saliency in our sampling of
policy issues, we coded articles from Jyllands-Posten in Denmark, Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung in Germany, The Daily Telegraph in the United Kingdom, Svenska
Dagbladet in Sweden, and NRC Handelsblad in the Netherlands.
5. Our measure does not cover the whole observation to avoid bias resulting from
issues that would experience policy change at a later stage and, hence, would
receive more coverage in the time preceding change.
6. Given that we expect decreasing returns for the number of actors, the measure
is logged in the analysis.
7. A signiﬁcant likelihood ratio statistic provides strong evidence that between-
issue variance is diﬀerent from zero in all of the regressions.
8. The remaining covariates in the calculation of margins in this and subsequent
calculations are held constant at their observed values.
9. In addition to examining the extent to which diﬀerent types of individual advo-
cates are aligned with public opinion, Online Appendix E presents supplemen-
tary tests at the issue level where we compare measures for all actors belonging
to a given group type on an issue to public opinion. These issue-level results also
deliver mixed support for the expected relationship between group type and
opinion representation put forward in Prediction 1.
10. Robustness checks replacing the HHI with another commonly used measure of
diversity: Shannon’s H show similar results (see Models F1-F3 in Online
Appendix F).
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